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Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems
Kevin M. Clermont* & Stephen C. Yeazell**
ABSTRACT: The U.S. Supreme Court revolutionized the law on pleading
by its suggestive decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
definitive decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. But these decisions did more than
redefine the pleading rules: by inventing a foggy test for the threshold stage
of every lawsuit, they have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.
This destabilization should rekindle a wide conversation about
fundamental choices made in designing our legal system.
Those choices are debatable. Thus, the bone this Article picks with the Court
is not that it took the wrong path for pleading, but that it blazed a new and
unclear path alone and without adequate warning or thought. This Article
argues that wherever you stand on pleading-whether you think the federal
litigation system is wildly overburdened with frivolous suits, or whether you
think the role of pleading should be further purified to eliminate its
screening function entirely--you should find these recent decisions
lamentable.
This Article describes the Court's choice to shift from minimal notice
pleading to a robust gatekeeping regime, and next gives some reasons for
thinking that the Court's course on this important matter may promise the
worst of both worlds. Then, after some thoughts on the Court's possible
motivation, it briefly offers some ways out of the bog.
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INVENTING TESTS, DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS
The headline need no longer equivocate after two recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases: Pleading Left Bleeding. The Court has revolutionized the law
on pleading. Litigators (and procedure scholars) have taken note of the
Court's fresh pair of decisions, the suggestive Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1
and the definitive Ashcroft v. IqbaL2 But these decisions do more than
redefine pleading rules. By inventing a new and foggy test for the threshold
stage of every lawsuit, they have destabilized the entire system of civil
litigation. 3 Although we shall have to justify calling it a destabilization, the
overall effect should cause even those without a special interest in pleading
to take notice.
4
These decisions should also reopen debate over the fundamental
choices made during our legal system's design. Choices such as this one,
how accessible to make the system of justice for complainants or,
alternatively, how much process to inflict on their opponents, are of course
debatable. Indeed, because the litigation system plays so central a role in
governing our society, all interested persons should have the opportunity to
debate the major choices before anyone makes large changes to the status
quo. The bone this Article picks with the Court is not that it took the wrong
path for pleading, but that by blazing a new and unclear path alone and
without adequate warning or thought it left the pleading system in shambles.
This Article will conclude that wherever you stand on pleading-
whether you think the federal litigation system is awash with frivolous suits,
or whether you would purify the role of pleading by eliminating entirely its
screening function-you should lament these recent decisions. To get there,
we shall first describe the Court's choice to replace minimal notice pleading
with a robust gatekeeping regime, and we next shall give some reasons for
1. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). This decision surprised many
observers despite a forewarning that lay, somewhat ambiguously, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (dismissing a securities complaint as insufficient).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). This decision clarified the intricate workings
and broad applicability of Twombly.
3. For a judge's lament, see generally Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended
Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 851 (2008).
4. By discombobulating a basic area of law, Twombly managed to generate an absolutely
extraordinary 22,980 judicial citations in its first thirty-two months, as measured by a Westlaw
KeyCite run on January 15, 2010. In its first seventy-two years, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), garnered only 13,546 citations! Twombly's ascension must represent the all-time
fastest accelerating citation count for a new case, as it leaves the early years of the overall
citation champs, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, in the dust. See Adam
N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty
Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REx. 81, 86-88, 143-45 (2006) (compiling tables of
most-cited cases). Of course, Twombly generated a mountain of commentary from academics
too, much of which we shall cite herein. Although much of that commentary debated the
mysteries of Twombly, some of which Iqbal resolved, a new round of tumult over the combined
cases surely lies ahead, as the countless foothills of chatter on the blogs and listservs attest.
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thinking that the Court's preference may promise the worst of both worlds.
Then, after some thoughts on the Justices' possible motivations, we shall
briefly sketch some routes for escaping the bog.
I. WHAT THEY DID
Pleading serves as the gatekeeper for civil litigation. A lawsuit dismissed
because the complaint fails to make the requisite allegations never reaches
the stage at which the evidence supporting those allegations can emerge.
This early demise produces great social benefit if, in the end, the facts would
not have supported a judgment for the plaintiff. The same early demise
inflicts considerable social harm if, in the end, the facts would have
supported such a judgment, but for the claim foundering over a mere defect
in the complaint.
A. THE OLD DAYS
Acting under the authority of the Rules Enabling Act,5 the Supreme
Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938. One of
those Rules, Rule 8, proclaimed a new day in pleading. 6 In the effort to end
centuries of dispute over the words the plaintiff needed to say to start a
lawsuit, the new Rule proclaimed that a complaint would suffice if it
contained "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."
7
The older view had held that pleadings must accomplish a great deal
more, laying out the issues in dispute and stating the facts in considerable
detail.8 But the rulemakers felt that this view asked too much of the pleading
stage, which consequently had become the center of legal attention, ended
up mired down in battles over technicalities, and provided a vehicle for
monumental abuse. 9 The accompanying Appendix of Forms illustrates just
how serious the rulemakers were about simplifying pleading. Form 11 sets
5. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (2006)).
6. Some have contended that the Court, in its longtime leading case on pleading, Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), departed from the design of the original Rules, so these scholars
date notice pleading from 1957 rather than 1938. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom
No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685-86 (1998) (arguing that the original Rules
maintained at least a modest gatekeeping function for pleading). All would agree that Conley at
least settled the debate over notice pleading, creating a peace that lasted for decades. See Emily
Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 317-18
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (describing the impact of Conley).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (2). The language remains the same in the current version of the
Rule.
8. See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A
BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1069-76, 1117-23 (10th ed. 2010) (describing the historic
regime); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 333-44 (7th ed. 2008) (same).
9. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (elaborating the motivation for the federal reform).
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forth a vehicular-negligence claim in thirty-seven words, achieving this
brevity in part by blessing the use of conclusory terms: "[T] he defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle .... As a result, the plaintiff was physically
injured. ..."10
Such conclusory brevity prevents expensive squabbling over the
formulation of the grievance, but makes starting a lawsuit unsupported by
evidence very easy. It may be that the defendant was not negligent, that he
was negligent but his negligence did not cause the accident, that the
plaintiff suffered no injury, or even that there was no accident at all and so
the claim was fabricated. How can a defendant meet such unjustified claims?
Under the rulemakers' system, the answer lay in mechanisms for forced
uncovering of evidence and for ending the case short of trial if the evidence
uncovered would not support a judgment for the plaintiff. The motivating
theory was that the stages subsequent to pleading-disclosure, discovery,
pretrial conferences, summary judgment, and trial-could more efficiently
and fairly handle functions such as narrowing issues and revealing facts, and,
thus, the whole system could better deliver a proper decision on the merits.
Under the Rules, then, pleading was a pervious gate. Its main task was
to give fair notice of the pleader's basic contentions to the adversary (and
the court and the public). It passed most of the screening function from the
threshold to later stages of litigation.
This postponement of screening constituted a fundamental choice in
procedural design, a choice that is surely debatable. Some of the persistent
opposition to such permissive pleading flowed from the costs of the later
stages, to which the Rules had transferred the screening function.
Uncovering evidence to demonstrate the weakness of the plaintiff's claim
entails expenses that the defendant cannot recoup from the plaintiff. In
some cases-like Twombly and Iqbal--those costs may be great, either in
financial outlay or in time and energy diverted from important public or
private tasks. But until Twombly and Iqba4 the system of civil litigation
remained on the chosen path, mainly performing the screening function
not at the pleading stage but at the fact-development and fact-testing stages.
Most observers retained the belief that this choice was a good one, 11 while
10. FED. R. CIv. P. FoRM 11. After an allegation ofjurisdiction, the current version of Form
11 offers these two sentences: "On [date], at [place], the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or
income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of $[amount]." Id.
The original Form 9 provided basically the same form, with a little more detail.
11. See, e.g., CHARLEs E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CODE PLEADING 54-57, 240-45
(2d ed. 1947) (extolling simplified pleading); Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456,
460-62 (1942) (same). Whether or not Judge Clark favored "notice pleading," he certainly
supported simple pleading. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 299-303 (discussing Clark's view and its
critics).
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the groups charged with revising the Rules rejected any major alterations to
the Rules after hearing from bench and bar.
12
B. THERECENT CASES
Twombly and Iqbal changed everything, or at least appeared to do so.
The two cases shifted a significant portion of the screening function back to
the pleading stage.
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, telephone and Internet subscribers
brought a class action against various telecommunications giants, claiming
an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade. 13 Under antitrust law, however,
parallel and even consciously identical conduct unfavorable to competition
is not illegal if it comprises only independent acts by competitors without
any agreement.1 4 The complaint alleged parallel conduct in great detail,
explaining how each company sought to inhibit upstarts in its own region
and refrained from entering the other major companies' regions. But the
complaint alleged an agreement in conclusory terms based upon
information and belief because the plaintiffs had no proof yet in hand. 15
The obvious concern in this big, complex case was that the claims
opened the door to expensive discovery. Therefore, the Court upheld
dismissal on a pre-answer motion. According to the Court, the complaint
had to show an agreement among competitors.1 6 The defendants' behavior
was what each company would naturally have done in pursuit of its own
interests.1 7 The plaintiffs needed to give factual detail to make their
complaint plausible, yet they "mentioned no specific time, place, or person
involved in the alleged conspiracies."' 8 The plaintiffs, who "have not nudged
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," 19 had their
complaint dismissed.
12. See ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18-
19 (1955) (explaining reasons for not amending FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), reprinted in 12A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. F, at 644-45 (2009); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of
Pleading Practice, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1749, 1751-52 & n.18 (1998) (describing the decision in 1993-
1995 not to amend FED. R. Clv. P. 8 (a) (2)).
13. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549-50 (2007).
14. Id. at 553-54.
15. See id. at 550-51 (summarizing the plaintiffs' complaint).
16. Id. at 564.
17. See id. at 564-69 (explaining why the defendants' conduct fell short of conspiracy).
18. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
19. Id. at 570. The case died after the Court's decision, with the district court's file closing
later in 2007.
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In so ruling, the Court imposed an entirely new test on the pleading
stage, instituting a judicial inquiry into the pleading's convincingness. Thus,
in this case, Justice Souter for the Court ignored the conclusory allegation of
agreement. 20 It had to accept as true the allegations of parallel conduct, but
could still treat them as an inadequate "showing" of entitlement to relief
because they did not make plausible the existence of an actual agreement.
2 1
Justice Stevens, joined in relevant part by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.
He noted: "Whether the Court's actions will benefit only defendants in
antitrust treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a
complaint will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that
the future will answer."
22
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Two years later, the Court answered Justice Stevens's question. On
interlocutory appeal in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court ruled that Twombly applied
to all federal complaints and then overturned the lower courts' approval of
the complaint before it.2 3 Here, the civil-rights plaintiff, a Pakistani Muslim
arrested post-9/11 in the United States, sued high federal officials upon
allegations of "harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race,
religion, or national origin."24 The Court ignored conclusory allegations
regarding the cause of action's elements, including that the defendants
knowingly condoned a discriminatory policy.25 The Court then said the
remaining allegations did not suffice to make plausible that the Attorney
General and the FBI Director subjected the plaintiff to harsh confinement
because of his race, religion, or national origin.26 Such a determination of
plausibility is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense,"27 with the issue being
20. See id. at 555, 564 & n.9 (stating that because "more than labels and conclusions" are
required in pleadings, the plaintiffs could not meet the standard with "mere[] legal conclusions
resting on the prior allegations").
21. Id. at 570.
22. Id. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953-54 (2009) (stating that while the pleading
standard covers all civil actions, the case before the Court "fail[ed] to plead sufficient facts to
state a claim").
24. Id. at 1942.
25. See id. at 1951 (stating that "the allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be
assumed true" because "[t]hese bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in
Twombly, amount to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a
constitutional discrimination claim" (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007))).
26. See id. at 1951-52 ("To prevail [on the constitutional discrimination claim], the
complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of
classifying post-September-i1 detainees as 'of high interest' because of their race, religion, or
national origin.").
27. Id. at 1950.
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whether the content of the nonconclusory factual allegations "allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."28 Now, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, was in dissent.
One can easily imagine a reason to convert pleading back into a more
vigorous gatekeeper. As already noted, Twombly represented the kind of case
likely to prove expensive to litigate if it survived the pleading stage:
expensive because it would call for broad and deep discovery into the
defendants' actions as the plaintiffs sought to uncover either an explicit
agreement or some behavior that ordinary market incentives could not
explain, and, further, expensive because it would call for considerable
judicial supervision in ruling on the numerous discovery disputes likely to
arise in the process. By requiring the plaintiffs to uncover evidence-without
the benefit of compelled discovery-the Court eliminated a messy suit in
which the plaintiff was fishing for evidence of unlawful behavior. If all the
avoided private-and-public expenditures would have ended without a
finding of unlawful anticompetitive behavior, then everyone benefited from
the swift and early death of the lawsuit.
The reason is even closer to the surface in IqbaL Again, substantive law
provides the handle. On the one hand, the Court has authorized civil-rights
claims against public officials based directly on the Constitution.29 On the
other hand, recognizing that these claims risk paralyzing public officials who
could spend many of their waking hours in depositions and also risk
demoralizing those considering public service, the Court has, over the years,
erected various substantive30 and procedural 31 barriers to civil-rights claims.
28. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. On remand, the Second Circuit sent the case back to the
district court for a decision on whether to grant leave to amend, lqbal v. Ashcroft, 574 F.3d 820,
822 (2d Cir. 2009), and:
Since then, Iqbal's lawyer, Alex Reinert, said he has been in settlement talks with
the government. But if the case is not settled, Reinert said he plans to amend the
pleadings to include facts that the Court said were missing-facts he obtained
during a period of discovery before the high court ruled. "We think we can meet
the new standard," said Reinert, who teaches at Yeshiva University Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law. "We absolutely still could win."
Tony Mauro, Groups Unite to Keep Cases on Docket: Plaintiffs' Lauryers Seek to Stop Dismissals After
Iqbal Decision, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1, 32, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1202433931370.
In a very similar case, with slightly more specific allegations, the Ninth Circuit
approved the complaint. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 973-77 (9th Cir. 2009). But see Arar
v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing complaint).
29. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a civil-rights claim against public officials based on the Fourth
Amendment).
30. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (establishing qualified
immunity).
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Because none of these barriers was going to head off Javaid Iqbal soon
enough, the Court felt it had to intercede.
Iqbal named personally two high officials and made allegations against
them that, if true, clearly crossed the line into unlawful behavior. He alleged
that Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller had acted "on
account of (plaintiff's] race, religion, or national origin, in contravention of
the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution" in confining him.
32
Defending these cases would very likely have involved many hours of
depositions of high public officials with possibly discouraging effects on
future public servants. It might also require the United States to lay bare
substantial amounts of information about the early, and perhaps panicked,
behavior in the months immediately following September 11. So the Court
again reached into its pleading toolkit and once again pulled out its new
wrench. The complaint failed, said the majority, because:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient [nonconclusory] factual matter, accepted as true, to
"state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a
defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'
'33
C. THE CURRENT CRITERIA
To summarize, the Court in these two cases added a requirement for
claimants34 that goes above and beyond having to give notice. From Rule
31. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985) (authorizing collateral-order
review); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 731-32 (1982) (same).
32. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
33. Id. at 1949 (citations to Twombly omitted).
34. The Court was construing the word "showing" in Rule 8(a) (2) governing claims, which
does not appear in Rule 8(b) or (c) on answers, and was establishing a gatekeeping test for
people trying to get into court, which does not bear on the opposing party. Nevertheless, in the
current confusion, some lower courts are applying the new test to defenses as well. See, e.g.,
Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 09-10239-RGS, 2009 WL 2449872, at *1 (D. Mass.
Aug. 6, 2009) (dictum) ("Assuming, without deciding, that sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander, the court is inclined to think that a defendant has the same Rule 8 obligations ... as
does a plaintiff."); Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21,
2009) (finding the affirmative defense insufficiently pled under Twombly). Likewise, lower
courts are magnifying the destabilization by confusingly applying the new test to issues beyond
the merits, such as jurisdiction, see, for example, Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts,
Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying Twombly to personal jurisdiction, but using
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8(a) (2)'s required "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief' and, more particularly, from its required
"showing," the Court unearthed the requirement that at the pleading stage
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing, by nonconclusory allegations,
the complaint's plausibility as to liability on the merits. 35 Although much
puzzlement persists, pleading apparently now works in the following way.
First, as to legal sufficiency, the judge decides any pure issues of law in
the traditional way for a Rule 12(b) (6) motion.3 6 This test asks whether any
legal claim exists that would be consistent with the words of the complaint.
That is, the complaint must encompass a legal claim without including
allegations that would defeat it. Practically, however, the plaintiff must now
do more to identify the complaint's legal theories, doing so well enough for
the judge to weigh their factual sufficiency.
Second, as to factual sufficiency, the plaintiff practically must plead facts
and even some evidence. The plaintiff should give a particularized mention
of the factual circumstances of each element of the claim. The degree of
particularization should be sufficient to make plausible an inference of
liability. The judge does not test the plausibility of each fact, but only of
ultimate liability. The judge performs the decisional task by ignoring any
conclusory allegation, such as a bald assertion that an element exists, and
then, after accepting the remaining allegations as true, by weighing the
plausibility of the liability inference in light of his judicial experience and
common sense as applied to the case's particular context. The plaintiff who
needs discovery to learn the required factual particulars is the person whom
the Court has newly put injeopardy.
37
it to uphold jurisdiction), or class allegations, see, e.g., Hodczak v. Latrobe Specialty Steel Co.,
No. 08-649, 2009 WL 911311, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding class allegations too
speculative under Twombly).
35. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 ("[T]he complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-
'that the pleader is entitled to relief."' (quoting FED. R. CIrV. P. 8(a) (2))).
36. See FLEMINGJAMES,JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,JR. &JOHN LEUBSDORF, CVIL PROCEDURE
242-43 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining that the judge is to resolve legal questions in the ordinary
fashion to determine whether the law recognizes the alleged claim).
37. The text here is a distillation of our best reading of the Court's opinions, and the rest
of this Article will flesh it out. Previously, some struggled to make sense of Twombly by reading it
narrowly, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REv. 873, 935-36 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Pleading Rules] (arguing that what he saw as
the Court's "thin plausibility" standard could be justifiable, if adopted by the proper statute or
rule process). But Iqbal undid them. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and
Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467799 [hereinafter Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited] (criticizing
"thick" screening). Now, others are taking up the same task, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1442786 (reconciling Twombly and Iqbal with pre-Twombly authority by developing a new
paradigm of "plain pleading"). Only time will tell whether their efforts to get lower courts to
confine these cases will warrant an evaluation like that of Samuel Johnson on second marriages:
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II. WHY IT MATnTERS
"In my view, the [Iqbal] Court's majority messed up the Federal Rules,"
Justice Ginsburg has since reflected publicly.38 We agree that the Court's
route to Iqba's result, built on Twombly's trail, will mess up the civil litigation
system. The Court's approach will impact the 270,000 civil cases filed
annually in the federal courts, which are bound by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 9 It may affect the
thirty or so states that have adopted the Federal Rules as their pleading
model,40 but only if the courts of those states find Twombly and Iqbal
persuasive. 4 1 The baleful effects, whose seriousness justifies using the term
"[T]he triumph of hope over experience." JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON,
LL.D. 450 (1791).
38. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks for Second
Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_06-12-09.html; see Adam Liptak, From Case About 9/11, Broad Shift on
Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/
us/21bar.html ("But something much deeper and broader was going on in the [Iqbal decision,
something that may unsettle how civil litigation is conducted in the United States."). Professor
Arthur R. Miller similarly opined: "'I have spent my whole life with the federal rules, and this is
one of the biggest deals I have ever seen.'" Mauro, supra note 28, at 31. In a congressional
hearing, Miller called Twombly and Iqbal "a philosophical sea change in American civil
litigation." Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (testimony of
Arthur R. Miller), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/ 111th/11 1-36_
53090.PDF.
39. See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/annualreports/2008/2008AnnualReport.
pdf (giving federal-court data).
40. SeeJohn B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1428 (1986) (giving the number as twenty-
nine states, plus the District of Columbia); cf Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 n.5
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing twenty-six states, plus the District of Columbia, that use
the Conley standard); Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A
Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REv. 311, 379-83 (2001) (suggesting that uniformity of practice can be
somewhat greater than sometimes assumed on the basis of written rules). See generally John B.
Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. LJ. 354 (2003) (updating his
earlier article by studying state adoption of recent federal amendments).
41. Neither case has any constitutional dimensions, we believe. Both are common-law
glosses on an existing Rule, and so have only persuasive force outside the federal system. See,
e.g., Crum v. Johns Manville, Inc., 19 So. 3d 208, 212 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (rejecting
Twombly in a Federal Rules state); lannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass.
2008) (adopting Twombly in a Federal Rules state); cf. Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472,
476-77 (Cal. 2009) (asserting anew in a code state that "we may affirm the sustaining of a
demurrer only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory").
See generally Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and
Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1470 (2008) ("The Twombly decision presents
Conly states with perhaps the most critical civil procedure decision since they chose to adopt
the Federal Rules."). The best counterargument is that Twombly and Iqbal are pioneering a due
process principle that the plaintiff must make some showing on the merits before the
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"destabilization," flow from three connected problems: the Court not only
fixed on a novel and unpredictable test that applies to every case, but it also
followed a disruptive legal process in so altering a defining feature of the
litigation system.
A. A NOVEL TEST
The two cases profoundly changed the law of pleading by adopting a
procedural mechanism without precedent in the law. No prior model exists
to help us understand how to test factual sufficiency now. Indeed, there is
more than mere novelty involved. The new approach does not comfortably
mesh, but rather clashes, with the prior procedural system, which of course
magnifies the destabilizing effect that comes from cutting a procedural
system from its moorings.
In seeking restabilizing guidance, one naturally looks to procedural
experience for some help. But prior pleading provisions serve no such
purpose here because the Court's approach is thoroughly new. Most
significantly, the Court did not reimpose a heightened-pleading
requirement of the sort called fact pleading. That hoary requirement
demanded factual detail as an end in itself, not as a means to convey
plausibility. Whether or not desirable, readoption of fact pleading as a
general requirement would not destabilize the system, in part because the
courts have over a century of experience interpreting similar rules. 42 But
readoption was not the course chosen. The two new cases expressly
preserved prior cases as still-good law insofar as they had killed off any
heightened-fact-pleading standard absent a special Rule or statutory
provision.43 Instead, for the first time, pleadings must undergo a test not for
defendant has an obligation to participate. See DTD Enters., Inc. v. Wells, 130 S. Ct. 7, 7
(Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Sotomayor, J., in a separate statement upon denial of
certiorari) (suggesting that due process requires, in state court, some consideration of the
merits before imposing class-action notice costs on the defendant).
Although Erie does not carry state pleading law into federal court, sometimes federal
pleading law will preempt state law in state court. See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1, 38-41 (2006) (treating cases like Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949)).
Usually, however, state pleading law applies in state court, and federal pleading law applies in
federal court. The resulting disparity between lenient state pleading and robust federal
gatekeeping will increase the considerable incentive to remove. See Kevin M. Clermont,
Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1919, 1922-27 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont,
Litigation Realities Redux] (providing data that show a huge increase in the removal rate over the
last twenty years).
42. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 225-40 (treating code pleading); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 9, §§ 1296-1301.1 (treating FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) and securities fraud).
43. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that the simplified
pleading standards established by FED. R. Cirv. P. 8(a) apply to all civil actions with limited
exceptions); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (finding that a "'heightened pleading standard'" was "impossible to square
... with the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules");Joseph A. Seiner,
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factual detail, but for factual convincingness. In Twombly, the Court closed by
proclaiming that "we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
44
Because plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead particularized facts and
maybe even some evidence, the federal pleading product will usually not
look much different from a complaint in a heightened-fact-pleading regime.
Nevertheless, detail in factual allegations and convincingness as to the
ultimate inference of liability are fundamentally different requirements.
Nor does any prior model ground the new test for convincingness. The
two new cases ask whether inferring liability is "plausible" in light of the facts
nonconclusorily pled-that is, whether liability is a "reasonable inference."
45
This unavoidably probabilistic standard 46 appears equivalent to the standard
of decision for summary judgment (under which the movant must show that
no reasonable factfinder could find for the opponent).47 Both motions ask
After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 16-19), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1477519 (arguing that these older cases survived Twombly and Iqbal).
44. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
45. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); see infta text accompanying notes 77-
87, 111-14 (trying further to define "plausibility"). By contrast, in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323-24 (2007), the Court construed "strong inference" in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006), to mean that the
plaintiffs allegations must make the inference of scienter more than merely plausible or
reasonable, and instead make it cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent. Cf Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 532
(arguing that the statute has made the motion to dismiss in securities cases a hybrid falling
somewhere between Rule 12(b) (6) and Rule 56).
46. In Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, the Court said: "Asking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement." In Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), the Court said: "The
plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." But these statements did not disavow a
probabilistic standard-only a standard as high as more-likely-than-not.
47. The standards of decision under Rules 12(b) (6) and 56 for issues of pure law are
identical. As to facts, the Court's articulation and application of the new test in Twombly and
Jqbal may appear to require a stronger claim than does summary judgment, but that
relationship would be nonsensical. It would instead make policy sense to require a weaker claim
at the pleading stage, but (1) there is a limited number of choices among decisional standards,
(2) any standard less demanding than summary judgment's reasonable-possibility test would
equate to the old scintilla or slightest-possibility standard, and (3) nothing in Twombly or Iqbal
suggests that the Court meant such a low standard. See Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical
Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1122 & n.36,
1127 n.54 (1987) (distinguishing the slightest-possibility test from the reasonable-possibility
test). The Court rejected a Rule 12(b) (6) test that would knock out only "allegations that are
sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiffs
recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel." Iqbal 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). More convincingly, Twombly and Iqbal were not adopting a scintilla test because it
would not serve the Justices' gatekeeping purpose. See infra note 57 and accompanying text
(discussing the frivolity test). So, unless the Court has relaxed the traditional summary-
judgment standard by its decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), and relaxed only that
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whether a factual assertion is reasonably possible.48 However, a fundamental
difference exists in that the new test for Rule 12(b) (6) applies without Rule
56's factual development and procedural protections, which ensure the
plaintiff a full opportunity to assemble and present the case.49 Indeed, the
most startling aspect of Twombly and Iqbal is that they call for a judge to
weigh likelihood without any evidential basis and with scant procedural
protections, effectively creating a civil procedure hitherto foreign to our
fundamental procedural principles, at least in the absence of emergency.
Insisting on nonconclusory statements and then testing for a reasonable
inference constitutes a method not unknown at law, but doing so based on a
bare pleading is revolutionary.
1. Application by Supreme Court
To explore this jarring novelty further, consider the actual complaints
that the Twombly and Iqbal Courts held insufficient because the allegations
were too conclusory to pass into the promised land of plausibility. 50
Consider in particular the following passage from the Iqbal opinion, when
standard, the Twombly-Iqbal Courts seem to have collapsed the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56
standards of convincingness into one. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion:
The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly 11-13, 19 (Ill. Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 09-
16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1494683 (arguing that the same reasonable-
possibility test applies under Rules 12 (b) (6) and 56).
48. We are speaking here of the equivalence of the standards of decision, expressed in
terms of convincingness, not of the frequency of granting the two kinds of motions in practice.
As to frequency, Twombly-Iqbal tests the plausibility of only the overall inference of liability,
while summary judgment can burrow down to the fact-by-fact level. Moreover, the motions are
available in different circumstances that are unequally common: Twombly-Iqbal will have bite
where the plaintiff cannot or will not plead detail, while Rule 56 will be applicable wherever the
evidence imbalance is stark. In a case where both motions are available, it is hard to predict
which motion in practice would more easily succeed if it were the only one made. On the one
hand, fear of prematurely interceding and triggering an appeal, and of deciding without airing
the evidence, will discourage the judge from granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. On the other
hand, granting an early pleading motion will better serve the movant's interests and the court's
docket than granting a later summary judgment, so the judge may look at the complaint by
itself and see conclusoriness or implausibility. That is, the incentives seem to offset each other.
49. A less fundamental distinction is that the burden of persuasion for summaryjudgment
is on the movant, but under Twombly-Iqbal it appears to fall on the plaintiff to show a reasonable
inference. Indeed, putting an initial burden on the plaintiff distinguishes Twombly-Iqbal from all
other pleading motions. Nevertheless, this difference is not really important. First, the burden
of production can shift to the opponent on summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CiV. P.
56(e)(2). Second, whether the defendant must show that the plaintiff cannot create a
reasonable question or whether the plaintiff must show that a reasonable question exists is a
paper-thin distinction, especially given that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion there is no evidence to
present.
50. See Iqba4 129 S. Ct. at 1943-44 (describing and quoting the complaint); Twombly, 550
U.S. at 550-51 (same). The Iqbal complaint is available at 2004 WL 3756442 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2004). The Twombly complaint is available at 2003 WL 25629874 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003).
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the majority finally applied its new test to the complaint by navigating, in two
paragraphs, the two steps of "nonconclusoriness" and "plausibility":
We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Respondent pleads that petitioners "knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]" to harsh
conditions of confinement "as a matter of policy, solely on account
of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest." Complaint 96. The complaint alleges that
Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of this invidious policy, id.,
10, and that Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and
executing it, id., 11. These bare assertions, much like the pleading
of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a
"formulaic recitation of the elements" of a constitutional
discrimination claim, namely, that petitioners adopted a policy
"'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group." [Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979).] As such, the allegations are conclusory and not
entitled to be assumed true. To be clear, we do not reject these
bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or
nonsensical. We do not so characterize them any more than the
Court in Twombly rejected the plaintiffs' express allegation of a
"'contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive
entry"' because it thought that claim too chimerical to be
maintained. It is the conclusory nature of respondent's allegations,
rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles
them to the presumption of truth.
We next consider the factual allegations in respondent's
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief. The complaint alleges that "the [FBI], under the direction of
Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab
Muslim men ... as part of its investigation of the events of
September 11." Complaint 147. It further claims that "[t]he policy
of holding post-September-llth detainees in highly restrictive
conditions of confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was
approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions
in the weeks after September 11, 2001." Id., 69. Taken as true,
these allegations are consistent with petitioners' purposefully
designating detainees "of high interest" because of their race,
religion, or national origin. But given more likely explanations,
they do not plausibly establish this purpose.
5 1
51. Iqba, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (citations to Twombly omitted).
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One can easily agree with the two majorities that the allegations in both
complaints were conclusory. But the system of civil litigation created by the
Federal Rules had always credited conclusory allegations.52 Anyone who read
the Rules, the Appendix of Forms, and the preceding fifty years of case law
would have thought that a conclusory allegation sufficed. In addition to
Form l1's vehicular-negligence claim quoted above, 53 almost all of the
sample complaints in the Rules' Appendix of Forms consist of conclusory
allegations.54 Whether or not Form 11 is distinguishable from Twombly and
Iqba the other Forms permit conclusory allegations even in notoriously
complex cases. For example, patent cases are likely to entail extensive
discovery and cause experienced judges to shudder. But Form 18 tells us
that one can properly plead a patent claim in four sentences, of which the
critical one reads: "The defendant has infringed and is still infringing the
Letters Patent by making, selling and using electric motors that embody the
patented invention, and the defendant will continue to do so unless
enjoined by this court."
55
As to the Twombly and Iqbal complaints being implausible, the call is
more difficult. In Twombly, the implausibility of an agreement not to
compete was hardly self-evident. In Iqbal, implausibility did not flow from the
allegations being "unrealistic," "nonsensical," "chimerical," or "extravagantly
fanciful," said the Court.56 Dismissing a complaint composed of frivolous
allegations would not have been controversial. 57 Rather, the implausibility of
52. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9, § 1218, at 267 ("It should be clear from an
examination of the Official Forms that the federal rules do not prohibit the pleading of facts or
legal conclusions as long as fair notice is given to the parties.").
53. See supra note 10 (providing the Form's text).
54. Complaints seeking recovery of debts or mistaken payments (FED. R. Ctv. P. FORMS 10,
21), specific performance of a contract to convey land (FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 17), or
interpleader (FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 20), and complaints alleging negligence under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 13), conversion of property (FED. R. CIv. P. FORM
15), or patent or copyright infringement (FED. R. Civ. P. FORMS 18-19), all consist of terse,
undetailed, conclusory language.
55. FED. R. CIv. P. FORM 18. Only occasionally does one encounter an instruction like that
in Form 14 (Complaint for Damages Under the Merchant Marine Act) requiring the plaintiff to
"[d] escribe the weather and the [allegedly unseaworthy] condition of the vessel." FED. R. Civ. P.
FORM 14.
56. Iqba4 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
57. A court will disregard an allegation in a pleading that contradicts a proposition
judicially noticed. The court reads the attacked pleading as if such untenable allegations were
omitted, so that a demurrer or motion to dismiss does not admit any allegation in the attacked
pleading running counter to the court's judicial knowledge. The classic illustrative case at
common law was Cole v. Maunder, (1635) 2 Rolle's Abr. 548 (RLB.), in JAMES BARR AMES, A
SELECTION OF CASES ON PLEADING AT COMMON LAW 2,2 (Cambridge, Mass.,John Wilson & Son
1875) (translating the case from Law French to English), where an allegation that stones were
thrown "moUiter et moi manu" ("gently and with a gentle hand") was held not to be admitted by
demurrer, "for the judges say that one cannot throw stones moiter." Id. In Southern Ry. Co. v.
Covenia, 29 S.E. 219, 220 (Ga. 1896), the court took judicial notice that a child under two years
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Iqbal's complaint arose because there was another, more likely explanation
lying in a "nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally
present in the United States and who had potential connections to those
who committed terrorist acts. As between that 'obvious alternative
explanation' ... and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent
asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion."58 One can ask
"why not?"59 Meanwhile, one should worry that the Court was improperly
intruding on the factfinder's domain. 6° In any event, none of those Forms
requires a plaintiff to "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged."6 1 None of those Forms expects the court considering a Rule
of age was unable to have any earning capacity and held on demurrer that an allegation that
such a child performed valuable services did not stand as admitted.
A complaint that judicial notice perceives as frivolous will not survive a pleading
challenge. Cf Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) ("Most frivolous and vexatious
litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any
personal involvement by the defendant. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12, 56."). On the variety of
other frivolity tests, see Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411803. A particularly instructive context is the frivolity
test under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006) for proceeding informa pauperis, a test that comes early and
with no procedural protections, and can even come sua sponte before answer. In Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), the Court explained:
As we stated in Neitzke [v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)], a court may dismiss a
claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are "clearly baseless," 490 U.S.,
at 327, a category encompassing allegations that are "fanciful," id., at 325,
"fantastic," id., at 328, and "delusional," ibid. As those words suggest, a finding of
factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible ....
Id. at 32-33. Thus, the § 1915 standard is demanding on the defendant, like a scintilla test. See
generally Milton Roberts, Annotation, Standards for Determining Whether Proceedings In Forma
Pauperis Are Frivolous and Thus Subject to Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d), 52 A.L.R. FED. 679
(1981) (collecting cases in its supplement to §§ 5-6, 8-9); cf Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("'Frivolous' is of the same order of
magnitude as 'less than a scintilla.'"), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987). Twombly-Iqbal gives
the plaintiff similarly scant procedural protections, but requires the plaintiff to make the
tangibly stronger showing of plausibility. See supra text accompanying note 47 (suggesting that
plausibility means "reasonably possible").
58. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (citation to Twombly omitted).
59. See Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 217, 224-28
(2010) (arguing that only the Court's acceptance of a few-bad-apples narrative could lead it to
think the allegations were implausible).
60. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 837, 838-42 (2009)
(expressing a similar concern in connection with summary judgment); Suja A. Thomas, The
Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 759 (2009) (generalizing the concern); cf
supra note 47 and accompanying text (suggesting, optimistically, that "reasonable possibility"
remains the test).
61. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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12(b) (6) motion "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense"62 in
deciding whether the complaint is plausible in its "context." The design
principles of the Rules did not contemplate probing the allegations at the
pleading stage.63 As the designers of the Rules (and the successive Justices
who promulgated them) saw things, that probing should come later,
especially during discovery and on motions for summary judgment.
64
After Iqbal, then, a complaint hewing carefully to the standard reflected
by the sample Forms should, in theory, succumb to a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. 65 Plaintiffs would need to state far more detail in
their complaints in a nonconclusory fashion to establish plausibility. In
addition to variations with substantive "context," a complaint that survived
challenge in one district court might fail in another because of variations in
'judicial experience" and "common sense," encouraging plaintiffs to include
still more detail. Most important, plaintiffs would need to unearth their
detail before filing suit and without compelled discovery. Such a regime
would doubtless reduce whatever frequency of weakly founded suits that
now exists. Such a regime would also doubtless reduce the frequency of well-
founded suits that now require the assistance of discovery to make their
merits clear. The new procedural regime would exchange our current false
positives for an unknown number of false negatives, Today, defendants as a
group shoulder the burden of false positives. In the hypothesized new
regime, plaintiffs would shoulder the burden of false negatives.
2. Expected Retrenchment by Lower Courts
The Supreme Court's insistence on nonconclusory statements and
testing for a reasonable inference combine to create a novel test. Indeed, it
is so novel that if it prevails, we will have a procedural revolution on our
hands. If the lower courts really began to enforce this brave new procedural
world-dismissing all the complaints that complied with the spirit of the
Appendix of Forms but failed the Twombly-Iqbal test-a conversation about
its desirability would surely occur. That conversation would occur because
those whose oxen were gored would make themselves heard loudly. The
implicit design of the Rules and Forms lies open to challenge. There is
much to be said for both sides of the divide. If a judicial reformer, in the
62. Id. at 1950.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 5-12 (describing the original Rules reform).
64. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9, §§ 1201-1202 (treating the history and purposes
of federal pleading Rules).
65. See Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 09-245 WBS CMK,
2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009) ("Now, however, even the official Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Forms ... have been cast into doubt by IqbaL"). A complaint literally
tracking a Form would presumably survive. See FED. R. Civ. P. 84 (providing that "forms in the
Appendix suffice under these rules"). But a complaint conforming to the spirit of the Forms,
but on different facts, would be in jeopardy.
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heat of the moment, had really changed the rules without entertaining
debate, the arguments could not be ignored, but instead would need to be
formulated and considered. The system's designers would then have to
consider whether, on the whole, they preferred to impose litigation risks on
the false-negative side or the false-positive side.
Accordingly, although we do predict that courts will become more
active in scrutinizing complaints, we also predict, or at least we hope, that
courts will not begin to dismiss every complaint that fails Twombly-Iqbals
nonconclusory-and-plausible requirement-simply because the result would
be too revolutionary. 66 In other words, we do not expect a flood of decisions
resembling Professor David Shapiro's brilliant spoof opinion, which we
include as an Appendix. Our prediction remains tentative, however, given
that several civil procedure professors took the parody to be a real opinion
after it appeared on the Civil Procedure Listserv.67 Moreover, exactly how
the lower courts will manage to stay their hand is not clear. Iqbal does not
66. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically ?,
59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (finding a significant increase in the rate of dismissal in a
sample of Westlaw cases, especially for civil-rights cases); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with
Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv.
1011, 1029 (finding an insignificant increase in the rate of dismissal among a small sample of
Title VII cases on Westlaw); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the
Impact ofBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1837
(2008) (examining Westlaw cases and finding that the courts do not seem to be dismissing cases
at a significantly higher rate, except for civil-rights cases, where the rate of granting dismissal
jumped by eleven percent). Even putting aside the selection-effect concerns of litigants'
adjusting to the change in pleading law, these studies reveal only the district courts' perception
of Conley and Twombly (or Iqbal), not the actual dismissal rate. The reason is that their
methodology involves searching for citation to the perceivedly permissive Conley in the early
cases and to the perceivedly restrictive Twombly in the later cases, which would seem to bias the
sample in favor of overstating the increase in the actual dismissal rate after Twombly: in the early
period a dismissing court might be less apt to cite Conley than a court denying dismissal in that
same time period, while in the later period a dismissing court might be more apt to cite
Twombly than a denying court. (The Hatamyar study added the conjunctive search term "no set
of facts" for the early cases and "plausib!" for the Twombly cases, compounding the effect.
Hatamyar, supra, at 585.) Also, limiting the study to cases reported on Westlaw, and ignoring all
the unreported decisions on motions to dismiss, might accentuate this bias. However, if one
were to compile all dismissal decisions, the effects of Twombly and Iqbal would be hard to
measure because these precedents apply to only a restricted subset of motions to dismiss (and
result in final dismissal for a much smaller subset). These studies acknowledge, however, that
they were not measuring the effect on actual dismissal rate, and provide an interesting look at
these Supreme Court decisions.
For more on the possibly varying substantive impact of Twombly-lqbal, see Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights
and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 532-36 (2010). For a more general
argument that procedural change inevitably alters substantive law, see Thomas 0. Main, The
Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=11 13916.
67. Posting of David Shapiro, Professor, Harvard Law School, dshapiro@law.harvard.edu,
to civ-pro@listser.nd.edu (Oct. 8, 2009) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
make it easy for a court that wants to limit the new test's scope. The opinion
expressly states that Twombly's (and, by extension, Iqba's) holdings are
generalized interpretations of Rule 8,68 not a good-for-this-trip-only reading
for antitrust and Bivens cases, and not to be escaped by imposing discovery
restrictions instead.
69
Yet, even if the lower courts do somehow manage to retrench, we will
still have a novel pleading test in place. Any such lower-court resistance will
make the new regime even more unpredictably confusing than the one the
Supreme Court tried to create.
B. AN UNPREDICTABLE TEST
In merely describing the Supreme Court's new test, we all but
established that its meaning is very unclear. At a minimum, the fogginess
warns that any defendant's lawyer, faced with a complaint employing the
minimalist pleading urged by Rule 8's wording and the appended Forms'
content, commits legal malpractice if he or she fails to move to dismiss with
liberal citations to Twombly and IqbaL70 Rule 11 will not impede the
defendant's lawyer, given that the complaint in theory is now insufficient.
The plaintiff's response to the motion will provide a cheap form of discovery
for the defendant. Judges will vary in finding nonconclusory allegations of a
complaint implausible after considering the specific "'context"' of the case
and applying "'judicial experience and common sense."' 71 Therefore, many
plaintiffs will bear the expensive burden of these motions, even if the
68. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953-54 (2009).
69. But see, e.g., Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J., dictum)
(suggesting that Twombly and Iqbal were special cases involving complex litigation and qualified
immunity, respectively); Transcript of Proceedings at 2, 8, Madison v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C
3629 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2009) (Shadur,J.) (declaring "you don't have to be a nuclear physicist
to recognize that Twombly and Iqbal don't operate as a kind of universal 'get out of jail free'
card" and refusing to apply them in an employment-discrimination case). For additional
analysis, see also supra note 37 (citing optimistic readings of Twombly and Iqbal). For a more
plausible but still optimistic outlook on constraining the new test, see Edward A. Hartnett,
Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 507 (2010) (suggesting, most
interestingly, that discovery can proceed, even after Iqba4 while the motion to dismiss is
pending).
70. An experienced litigator, Tom Goldstein, predicts that Iqbal will be "'the basis for an
attempt to dismiss more than 50 percent of all the complaints filed in federal court."' Melinda
Hanson, Civil Cases: Iqbal, Ricci, Wyeth, NAMUDNO Tagged as Landmark Opinions of Term, 78
U.S.L.W. 3025, 3026 (July 21, 2009). Even the defendants in the Duke lacrosse case are pushing
Twombly-Iqbal arguments. See Durham-in-Wonderland, The Players' Iqbal Briefs, http://durham
wonderland.blogspot.com/2009/07/players-iqbal-briefs.html (July 20, 2009, 00:01 EDT)
(discussing those motions specifically); see also Justia.com, Evans et al. v. Durham, North
Carolina, City of et al., http://news.justia.com/cases/featured/north-carolina/ncmdce/
1:2007cv00739/46882/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (collecting all litigation documents in that
case).
71. Fowler v, Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting lqba4 129 S. CL at 1949).
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motions fail. 72 The plaintiffs who actually need discovery to show
nonconclusory plausibility will suffer a worse fate. 73 In any event, the courts
must put in the work to divine the meaning of the new test's two steps: first,
ignore conclusory allegations, whether predominantly legal or factual, and
second, weigh the plausibility of the liability inference in a contextual
manner with a personal feel.
The first step of the new test presents its own mysteries. Conclusory
allegations include a bare assertion that an element of the claim exists.74 But
perhaps they include other "deductions of fact" statements, as opposed to
more purely factual assertions.75 The likely bottom line is that the court
should look mainly at what the plaintiff appears to be alleging actually
happened (and then ask whether the elements of liability are a plausible
inference from those allegations taken as true). Yet, even though
conclusoriness may be unclear and will be subjective, deciding which
allegations to ignore as conclusory will do much of the critical work. In fact,
Justice Souter in his dissent argued that the majority in Iqbal wrongly
defeated the complaint not by manipulating plausibility, but by sweeping out
all sorts of good allegations as "conclusory."
76
The second step of measuring plausibility seems even more obviously
unclear.77 This measure lies entirely in the mind of the beholder. And the
72. See, e.g., id. (reversing the dismissal by finding that the plaintiff had stated a plausible
discrimination complaint).
73. See, e.g., Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *2
(W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009) (dismissing a complaint, with leave to amend, in a slip-and-fall case).
The court stated:
In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show how the liquid
came to be on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or should have known of the
presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiffs accident occurred.... While
consistent with the possibility of the Defendant's liability, the Plaintiffs conclusory
allegations that the Defendant was negligent because there was liquid on the flood
[sic], but that the Defendant failed to remove the liquid or warn her of its presence
are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
Id.
74. See Hartnett, supra note 69, at 491-93 (equating "conclusory" to alleging the claim's
elements).
75. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11 th Cir. 2009); see Steinman, supra
note 37, at 39-45 (defining "conclusory" as the failure to identify the real-world acts or events
that entitle the plaintiff to relief, that is, the failure to allege concretely what happened). But cf
Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 37, at 21-23 (arguing that this first step is
inherently incoherent and that courts should apply the plausibility test to the complaint as a
whole).
76. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1960-61 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(identifying allegations that the majority, but not he, considered conclusory). By contrast, the
Court found borderline allegations to be nonconclusory in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007), discussed infra note 107.
77. On the meaning of "plausibility," compare Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (translating "plausible" to mean that
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multitude of beholders, wearing judicial robes, has precious little
interpretive guidance given the measure's novelty in the law. The oral
argument in Iqbal itself suggested how deep the abyss of confusion might be,
even within the Supreme Court.
1. Of Mice and Men at Oral Argument
Justice Breyer-who in the end dissented in Iqbal--saw the problem in
broad terms and posed a revealing hypothetical:
How does-how does this work in an ordinary case? I should
know the answer to this, but I don't. It's a very elementary
question. Jones sues the president of Coca-Cola. His claim is the
president personally put a mouse in the bottle. Now, he has no
reason for thinking that. Then his lawyer says: Okay, I'm now going
to take seven depositions of the president of Coca-Cola. The
president of Coca-Cola says: You know, I don't have time for this;
there is no basis. He's-I agree he's in good faith, but there is no
basis. Okay, I don't want to go and spend the time to answer
questions.
Where in the rules does it say he can go to the judge and say,
judge, his lawyer will say, my client has nothing to do with this,
there is no basis for it; don't make him answer the depositions,
please? Where does it say that in the rules?
78
The colloquy among the Court and counsel continued, using this
mouse-in-the-bottle hypothetical as if it were the right analogy.79 But the
a complaint must "'contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory'" (quoting In re Plywood
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981))), with Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly
Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 1063, 1066 (2009) (translating "plausible" to mean "that the
allegations in a plaintiff's complaint must be logically coherent in the sense that, if accepted as
true, they are necessary and sufficient to establish a cause of action"). The subsequent Iqbal
decision implies that both were reading Twombly too narrowly. See supra text accompanying
notes 45-49 and infra text accompanying notes 111-14 (trying further to define "plausibility");
cf Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, There's a Pennoyer in My Foyer: Civil Procedure According to Dr.
Seuss, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 105, 116 (2009) (suggesting that plausibility might be defined as a
"yopp").
78. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL
5168391.
79. See, e.g., id. at 23 (offering Justice Kennedy's support for Justice Breyer's concerns).
Justice Souter was much more skeptical of the hypothetical's plausibility:
But in Justice Breyer's case, the-that may be the case if the claim is that the
president of Coke was personally putting mouses in bottles. But the claim, it seems
to me, that the Attorney General or the Director of the FBI was establishing a
policy of no release until cleared or a policy that centered on people with the same
characteristics as the hijackers does not have that kind of bizarre character to it
and, I think, would not run afoul of the plausibility standard.
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mouse hypothetical works better as a way of revealing the powerful virus
within Iqbal that may spread through the civil-justice system.
The power of the hypothetical emerges if one first considers the
ingredients of implausibility in Justice Breyer's hypothetical. The Coca-Cola
CEO has every moral, legal, and financial incentive not to do what he is
accused of doing-if detected, his act would, at the least, harm his company
and cost him his job. It is thus objectively implausible-yes, the CEO might
so act, but he would be doing so in defiance of all normal incentives.
Now contrast the ingredients of implausibility in Iqbal. The complaint
did not imply irrationality on the part of the Attorney General and the FBI
Director. Instead, urgency that approached panic affected many levels of
government in the weeks following September 11. Unsure when another
attack might occur, officials across the country took elaborate precautions,
some of which might look excessive in retrospect. 80 Unlike Justice Breyer's
CEO, government officials had incentives to take such precautions. Both
their own safety and the safety of their constituents might be on the line, to
say nothing of their jobs. Although high-ranking officials charged with
national law enforcement may not in fact have brushed aside constitutional
prohibitions at a moment of high national emergency, they surely had
incentives temporarily to disregard constitutional constraints. Some,
reflecting on past moments of national emergency, might have even thought
they had a duty to disregard some constitutional provisions.81 We have, of
course, no idea whether such a post-9/11 scenario occurred. But neither did
the Court. Our point is, rather, that the implausibility involved occupies a
Id. at 15; see also id. at 39-40 (returning to the hypothetical). As an advocate, Solicitor General
Gregory G. Garre saw the hypothetical in a way completely opposite to Justice Souter's, arguing
in rebuttal that "the Attorney General is much different than the president of Coca Cola in that
he is entitled to a presumption of regularity of his actions, so that-that standard itself ought to
affect how one views the complaint." Id. at 58.
Chief Justice Roberts addressed the running hypothetical and got right to its heart:
"[T]o follow up on Justice Souter's question, how are we supposed to judge whether we think
it's more unlikely that the president of Coca Cola would take certain actions as opposed to the
Attorney General of the United States?" Id. at 40. But he evaded the hypothetical by later
switching the analogy to a situation in which "the allegation is that the president of Coca Cola is
individually involved in a particular price fixing scheme," and then apparently concluding that
his hypothetical and Iqbal both failed the Twombly test. Id. at 42-43. Justice Stevens adjusted the
hypothetical similarly, but drew the opposite conclusion. Id. at 40-42.
80. See Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of
Constitutional Constraints 12, 17-18 (Univ. of Oxford, Dep't of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 425,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1374376 (finding an increase in human-rights
violations in various countries after 9/11, but also finding that the existence of independent
judicial review limited the increase).
81. For examples of cases discussing the effect of national emergencies on constitutional
provisions, see N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (involving the Pentagon
Papers); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (involving the
President's seizure of steel mills).
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different existential plane than that of the hypothetically deranged CEO of
Coca-Cola.
2. Doubted Clarification by Lower Courts
The Court's nimble willingness to jump the "plausibility gap"-the
chasm between the mouse hypothetical and the Iqbal allegations, a chasm
that the Court's followers will have more trouble gauging-may cause the
test's destabilization to spread virally through the civil-justice system. It will
be up to the lower courts to give the new test a predictable meaning. Good
reasons exist to doubt that they are up to the task.
Initially, the test goes to the 675 authorized federal district judges,
82
before whom come motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Many
motions will ask whether the nonconclusory allegations of the complaint
seem implausible enough to call for either amendment or dismissal. Given
the way in which the Court found the allegations in Iqbal implausible, it is
difficult to predict what allegations any given judge may find similarly
implausible: Did a public official fail to do her duty? Did a fiduciary prove
unfaithful? Did a manufacturer endanger buyers of its product? In all of
these situations, just as in Iqbal, the defendant's duty and long-term
considerations point in one direction, but short-term considerations, and
perhaps personal advantage, point in another. Until Twombly, no one
thought that Rule 8 required convincing allegations concerning such
matters. After Iqba4 it is difficult to say.
83
Matters are not likely to clarify quickly. After six hundred or more
judges apply their contextualized experience and common sense to the
plausibility of various sets of nonconclusory allegations, they will find some
complaints deficient under the new test and dismiss them. Some of those
plaintiffs will appeal, giving three-judge panels of the nation's thirteen
circuits their chance to review the rulings. 84 But because each complaint will
82. See U.S. Courts, Summary of Judicial Vacancies, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialvac.
cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (indicating that one hundred judicial vacancies currently exist);
cf. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2008,
at 38 tbl.12 (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/udicialBus2008.pdf (indicating that
over three hundred senior district judges also exist).
83. See, e.g., Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Twombly-
Iqbal to dismiss a suit against the government by anti-Bush demonstrators, with leave to amend
the complaint filed before the "significant change, with broad-reaching implications," of
Twombly-Iqbal); Alison Frankel, Two More 'Iqbat Dismissals Emerge in Product Liability Cases,
LAW.COM, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=120243273834
6 (opining that Iqbal "is quickly becoming the best thing to happen to the products liability
defense bar since Daubert").
84. Ordinarily, a complaint that survives a Rule 12(b) (6) motion cannot immediately be
appealed by a defendant who believes that it is implausible, because the denial is not a final
decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (setting out the jurisdiction of courts of appeals). If the
defendant declines to answer, the trial court will enter judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal
will lie. If the defendant proceeds to answer, as is much more likely, the appellate court will
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present a different factual configuration, it will likely take years before any
given circuit settles on a view of plausibility applicable to a wide variety of
common complaints.
85
At some point, of course, circuit disagreements will arise, and the
Supreme Court may choose to intervene, aiming to clarify its view of
plausibility. Still, unless the Court takes the very unlikely step of reversing
Twombly and Iqbal outright, its decision will inform us about the meaning of
plausibility only in a particular family of claims. After all, although the Court
extended Twombly (which many had predicted would remain confined to the
exotic area of conscious parallelism in antitrust claims86) to a very different
case involving allegations of unconstitutional behavior by high public
officials, that extension did not illuminate the meaning of plausibility. 87 The
treat the point as waived and, upon final judgment, will not reexamine the action of the trial
court in denying the motion to dismiss. Cf. Varghese v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 424 F.3d 411, 426
(4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a pretrial denial of summary judgment was not reviewable on
appeal after trial, even for a motion made on a purely legal ground). It is true that some of the
same Rule 12(b)(6) questions may reappear in a different guise. For example, at trial the
defendant might move for judgment as a matter of law, contending that the plaintiffs proof
does not constitute a claim for relief; the trial court's denial of that motion can be preserved for
review on appeal from the final judgment. Thus, the appellate court may in effect be passing on
the same question of law that confronted the trial judge on the motion to dismiss the
complaint, inasmuch as the question of legal sufficiency will be the same when the proof has
established the allegations of the complaint and nothing more. Nevertheless, any plausibility
testing of the pleading should not reappear in reviewable form. In any event, no rational court
would overturn a proven claim on the ground that its pleading was implausible or conclusory.
85. See Anthony Martinez, Case Note, Plausibility Among the Circuits: An Empirical Survey of
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV. 763, 770 (2009) (concluding-nonempirically-
that "[t] he new plausibility standard created in Twombly is not at all clear").
86. See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 122 (2007), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/31/lrcoll2007n31Bradley.pdf ("'Plausibility' is an
element of a certain kind of antitrust conspiracy claim, not a standard for pleadings in
general."); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604,
631-36, 639 (2007) (approving, with reservations, Twombly's application of pleading's
substantive-sufficiency test to this antitrust case); J. Douglas Richards, Three Limitations of
Twombly: Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a Context of Historical Monopoly, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
849, 851 (2008) (taking a very narrow view of Twombly); cf Smith, supra note 77, at 1083-85
(suggesting that Twombly applied only to complex cases involving significant discovery).
87. Just as for Twombly and Iqbal, differing substantive law will serve to distinguish the
application of the pleading test. For example, the Fifth Circuit stated:
In order to state a claim under RICO, a plaintiff must allege, among other
elements, the existence of an enterprise. Brunig's complaint does not make
plausible that either a legal enterprise or an association-in-fact existed. His
complaint alleges that "Clark, the Trust, CPLI, Liedtke, BBC, and others, known
and unknown, associated themselves in fact." This is a conclusory statement, a
recitation of the elements masquerading as facts. It does not make it any more or
less probable that the listed parties have an existence separate and apart from the
pattern of racketeering, are an ongoing organization, and function as a continuing
unit as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure.
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Court's fact- and context-specific approach guarantees that extrapolation to
new cases will remain difficult despite successive decisions.
Thus, we can expect a long period, perhaps a decade or more, of
sorting and jostling before we have even a slightly clearer idea about what
allegations must appear in complaints. Persistent confusion on such a
determinative feature contributes to major destabilization of civil
litigation-destabilization created by the Court's invention of a new and
jarring test, exaggerated by its unclear delivery, and intensified by the poor
legal process the Court followed.
C. A DISRUPTIVE TEST
Twombly and Iqbal destabilized the legal system in a third way: their
incipient revolution came by a legal process that, as applied to the pleading
problem, could possibly disrupt procedural design for years to come.
88
Since the promulgation of the Federal Rules in 1938, courts and
Congress have sought a consistent, predictable, and transparent process for
procedural reform. 89 Courts tend not to be overly activist in reading the text
of a Rule that emerged from the rulemaking process, and they should be
especially deferential to stare decisis there. 90 Congress, of course, controls
jurisdiction, and it has occasionally intervened with substantial procedural
reforms.9 1 For the most part, however, courts and Congress have left the
design of process to the rulemaking machinery.92 After statutory insistence
Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 200,9); see also Hartnett, supra note 69, at 496-97
(exploring the dependence of plausibility on substantive law).
88. Ironically, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and its version of notice pleading came
about through a similarly flawed legal process. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 317 (describing
Conley as an accidental precedent). But being not so novel or unpredictable, Conley induced
calm rather than disruption.
89. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 955 (1999) (justifying rulemaking as akin to
common-law reasoning, as long as rulemaking centers on "inferring general principles from
existing practice and choosing rules that implement those principles well in light of practice
realities"). See generally Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE
161 (1991) (defending the rulemaking process against factionalism).
90. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1147-52 (2002) (defending judicial restraint in reading the
Federal Rules). But see Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust
Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627, 640-45 (2008) (approving Twombly's test as a
transsubstantive rule implicit in Rule 12(b)(6)'s requirement that the pleader show entitlement
to relief).
91. For examples of such congressional intervention, see generally Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2006)).
92. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2006) (comprising the current version of the Rules
Enabling Act).
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on increased transparency, 93 this process now guarantees that notice,
comment, and a good deal of consultation among bench and bar will
precede significant (and even insignificant) procedural change. Although
such consultation has its own costs, and scholars have criticized the resulting
process as creaky and sometimes unimaginative or worse, 94 it does head off
ill-considered quick fixes.
Such was the relatively peaceful process picture until Twombly and Iqbal.
The Court, interpreting Rule 8 in that pair of cases, substantially altered a
systemic design choice. We regret the Court's move-again, not because we
are certain that we lived under the ideal pleading regime, but because we
are certain that a design change of this magnitude should occur only after a
thorough airing of the choices.
9 5
1. The Road Taken: Adjudication
Such an airing did not accompany Twombly or even IqbaL The Court had
given no forewarning adequate to generate public discussion. The
complicated issues were not sufficiently developed by lower-court
percolation, by academic or empirical studies, or even by parties' position-
taking.
There were amicus briefs in both cases,96 but such briefs did not and
could not, in a neutral manner, consider the broader design choices. They
93. Id. § 2073(c).
94. See generally WINIFRED R. BROwN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBILITIES (1981) (cataloguing the rulemaking problems of the participatory process,
institutional structure, and broad scope); Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 229 (arguing for simplifying the rulemaking process).
95. See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET YR WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CnvIL
PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 121-27 (2006) (arguing that the debate must occur in a broad
historical, social, economic, political, and jurisprudential context). For a comparative
perspective on the debate, see Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 441, 452-55 (2010) (describing heightened-fact-pleading regimes elsewhere); cf
Andrea Cheuk, Comment, The Li'an ('Docketine') Process: Barriers to Initiating Lawsuits in China
and Possible Reforms, 26 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 72, 75-79 (2008) (describing a system of extreme
policing of complaints).
96. The ABA uploaded the following amicus briefs for Iqbak Brief of William P. Barr et al.
and Washington Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner; Brief of National
Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents; Brief of Amici Curiae,
The Sikh Coalition et al. in Support of Respondent Iqbal; Brief for the American Association
for Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent; Brief of Amici Curiae Japanese American
Citizens League et al. in Support of Respondent; Brief for Ibrahim Turkmen et al. in Support of
Respondents; and Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Practice as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents. ABA, Merit Briefs for December Supreme Court Cases, Term 2008-
2009 (ABA Division for Public Education), http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/
dec08.shtml#ashcroft (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). For Twombly, FindLaw uploaded the following
amicus briefs in support of petitioners: Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners;
Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and 15 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners; Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars in Support of Petitioners; and Brief of the
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came at the questions either as plaintiffs or defendants, activists or
businesses, or conservatives or liberals. Indeed, the resultant ideological
tone is some proof that the questions involved were more appropriately
congressional than judicial.
Moreover, no brief marshaled data. Fundamental choices should be
informed by information as well as argument. It is not uncommon for
empirical scrutiny to contradict things that "everyone knows" about
litigation, and so it is possible to create very bad procedure by failing to
verify folk wisdom. 97 Data, if available, would be key in deciding whether
pleading should play a greater gatekeeping role. One would want to know
the "success rates"98 of a sample of reported and unreported cases that
satisfied notice pleading but would unavoidably fail the more stringent test.
One would also want to know about the costs of discovery, time required for
disposition, kinds of cases, and more. Although some of these data are easily
available, others exist only in difficult-to-access forms, some do not exist, and
some will never exist. Nevertheless, over the past decade, the Federal
Judicial Center showed itself capable of producing good statistics on topics
of rulemaking interest.99 Other groups, like the National Center for State
Courts and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, also produced valuable
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al-and in favor of the respondents:
Brief of the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Respondents. FindLaw, Supreme Court
Docket: Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 05-1126, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/
supreme~court/docket/2006/november/05-1126-bell-atlantic-v-twombly.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2010). More amicus briefs appear on Westlaw, including Brief of Amici Curiae Legal
Scholars Debra Lyn Bassett, et al. and of Certain Purchasers of Elevators and Elevator
Maintenance Services, Including Transhorn Ltd., et al. in Support of Respondents, Bell Ad.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2966600 (including Kevin M.
Clermont as a signatory).
97. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 119 (2002) (surveying empirical knowledge of civil procedure); Clermont, Litigation
Realities Redux, supra note 41 (updating data in 2009).
98. Assuming one could assemble such a sample, one might define "success rate" as the
percentage of claims found to be well-founded, as evidenced either by ajudgment on the merits
or by a settlement sufficiently close to initial demands to serve as a reliable proxy for such a
judgment. But we recognize that accounting for the case-selection effect, which concerns cases
never brought, would be a huge problem. One model is the fine study of the effect of
heightening pleading standards done by Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson, and A.C. Pritchard.
See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J.
EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 64-65 (2009) ("[Mlany suits that would have been deemed
nonnuisance prior to the PSLRA likely would not be filed after Congress adopted the PSLRA.").
Another feasible approach would be to study different state pleading regimes comparatively,
trying to get a feel for the costs of false positives and false negatives.
99. For an example, see Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to
Judge Michael Baylson (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://www.nc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf (reporting research on summary judgment). The Federal
Judicial Center is now collecting data on motions to dismiss. SeeJudicial Conference Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure, Minutes 40 (Jan. 14-15, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Minutes/ST01-2008-min.pdf (mentioning plans to collect data at a panel discussion
on pleading).
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studies of possible procedural changes.10 0 The Court did not demand data.
Even though the absence of data is normally an argument against altering
the status quo, the Court plunged ahead. The simple fact remains that, even
after Twombly and Iqba4 there are still no empirical studies whatsoever on the
virtues of case exposition through differing approaches to pleading, and
thus no data exist on the extent of the Rules' former pleading problem or
the efficacy of the Court's imposed cure.
10 1
2. The Road Not Taken: Rulemaking
Even before Twombly, some had criticized notice pleading as excessively
lax.10 2 One can view some of the last three decades' Rules amendments as
responses aimed at this arguable failing. For example, Rule 11 now punishes
those who make allegations without an evidentiary basis for doing so;
103
indeed, one could have less disruptively attained an equivalent of the
Twombly and Iqbal regime by aggressively rereading Rule 11 rather than Rule
8.104 As another example, Rule 26 now provides that normally no discovery
100. See, e.g., PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIE P. HANS, NICOLE L. MoTr & G. THOMAS
MUNSTERMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 13-14 (2002),
available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ uries&
CISOPTR=27 (considering the desirability of nonunanimous verdicts to address the problem of
hung juries in criminal cases); JAMES S. KAKALIK, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, DANIEL MCCAFFREY,
MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAJANA, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION
DATA, at xxvii (1998), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/2009/
MR941.pdf ("Discovery is not a pervasive litigation cost problem for the majority of cases.").
101. See Michael Chiorazzi et al., Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure: A Selected Annotated
Bibliography, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 87, 120 ("[Tlhere are no studies on
pleading per se, perhaps because of the advent of modem notice pleading."); Civil Rules
Advisory Comm., Minutes 37-38 (May 22-23, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf (discussing possible amendment to FED. R. CIv. P. 8 and
noting the lack of data); Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes 29-35 (Oct. 27-28, 2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CVI 1-2005-min.pdf (same).
102. E.g., Hazard, supra note 6, at 1671-72 (noting the potential problems associated with
notice pleading); Sherwin, supra note 6, at 318-20 (same); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 985, 992-94 (1987) (same).
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring that every paper, and thus every claim, be signed to
certify that, to the best of the signer's "knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," it has factual support).
104. As things have worked out, the new toughness under Twombly-Iqbal does not mesh
easily with the relative leniency under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b) (3) (providing that the signature
warrants that "the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery"). On the one hand, a Twombly-.qbal dismissal should not necessarily imply a Rule 11
violation for lack of evidentiary support. On the other hand, a plaintiff with very little
knowledge of the facts apparently could use such specifically identified allegations to
circumvent Twombly-lqbal initially, but would then likely fall to a Rule 11 motion. See Posting of
Tobias B. Wolff, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, twolff@law.upenn.edu, to civ-
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may proceed-the great worry of the Twombly and Iqbal majorities 5-until
the parties have adopted, or the judge has ordered, a discovery plan, which
can specify "whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited
to or focused on particular issues."1 6 These measures sought to keep the
gate, preventing unwarranted "fishing expeditions" and excessive and
burdensome discovery requests. Moreover, these measures pursued those
ends without the destabilizing effects of Twombly-IqbaL
Those measures may well have been imperfect. It is entirely arguable
that pleading should provide additional, and more vigorous, gatekeeping.
But before discarding the pleading system that has been in place for many
years, we ought to discuss its virtues and failures soberly and with the
relevant information before us. The rulemaking bodies should have hosted
that discussion. Twombly and Iqbal short-circuited any such discussion. These
cases worked their reform by a process-adjudication-that is hardly the
preferred path to design change.
III. WHY THEY DID IT
Many observers glance at these cases from the Supreme Court and see
the same old right/left story: the conservatives seek to protect rich or
powerful defendants, while the liberals stand with the little plaintiffs. But
that story immediately runs into the uncomfortable fact that Justice Souter
wrote Twombly andJustice Breyerjoined him, yet both wrote dissents in Iqbal.
More to the point, all opinions in the two cases smack more of
confusion than of political motivation. Indeed, it is quite hard to resist the
conclusion that the Justices inadvertently stumbled into a new procedural
era. Justice Souter seemed to have no idea where he was going.10 7 Despite
pro@listserv.nd.edu (June 7, 2009) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (discussing the
interaction of Rules 8(a) (2) and lI(b) (3)).
105. See infra note 124 (discussing reform aimed at discovery costs).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(B); see id. 26(d) (prohibiting earlier discovery); see also id.
26(c) (involving protective orders).
107. The other Justices seemed just as confused, judging from their decision to overturn
the pleading dismissal in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam), just two weeks
after Twombly. In that case, the pro se plaintiff brought a civil-rights claim against prison officials
for their wrongful termination of his medical treatment for hepatitis C, alleging that this action
endangered his life. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 89-90. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, on
the ground that the plaintiff had pleaded the substantial-harm element in a "conclusory"
fashion. Id. at 93. The Supreme Court vacated the ruling for having departed "in so stark a
manner from the pleading standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at
90. It cited Twombly for the propositions that notice pleading does not require allegations of
"specific facts" and that the "judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint," but it did not reach and made no reference to any plausibility test. Id. at 93-94.
Although later the lower court could effectively find the ultimate inference of liability to be
plausible, given that the allegations had survived the nonconclusoriness hurdle, Erickson v.
Pardus, 238 F. App'x 335 (10th Cir. 2007), the Supreme Court hardly seemed on top of its new
test. The Court's summary action was per curiam, with Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting on
other grounds. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 95.
[2010]
INVENTING TESTS, DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS
some fairly undeniable implications in his Twombly majority opinion, Justice
Souter finished by complaining futilely of "a fundamental
misunderstanding" of it by the Iqbal majority.10 The oral argument revealed
further confusion, as well as some unhappy facts about the deciding Court.
Only Justice Souter had ever sat on a trial bench, and he did so in the non-
Federal Rules state of New Hampshire. 10 9 Therefore, it is hardly surprising
that no one leapt forward to answer Justice Breyer's above-quoted "very
elementary question" in Iqbal about how the Rules control discovery. No
Justice distinguished himself or herself.110
Another piece of circumstantial evidence of inadvertence is how the
Justices alighted on the buzzword "plausibility."11' Not only was it new to the
108. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. See Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (providing
biographical sketches); Oakley & Coon, supra note 40, at 1409 (describing New Hampshire's
procedural system as "idiosyncratic"); see also Adam Liptak, Roberts Sets Off Debate on Judicial
Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/
us/17bar.html ("Chief Justice Roberts did say that the current justices' limited trial court
experience was 'an unfortunate circumstance' and 'a flaw."'); cf The White House, Judge Sonia
Sotomayor, http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/26/sonia-sotomayor-judge-business-washington-
supreme-court-background.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (stating that Judge Sotomayor
replaces Justice Souter as the only Justice with experience as a trial judge). Whatever litigation
experience any other Justice had in practice was scanty and long ago. See Luther T. Munford,
Recent Litigating Counts, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 2004, at 43, 43 (suggesting "the creation of a
'litigator's seat"').
110. Justice Breyer in the Iqbal argument expressed further puzzlement about the
possibility of limiting discovery as an alternative to testing the pleading. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 78, at 17 ("I want to know where the judge has the power to control
discovery in the rules. That's-I should know that. I can't remember my civil procedure course.
Probably, it was taught on day 4."). Although Solicitor General Garre immediately pointed him
to FED. R. Civ. P. 26, Justice Breyer did not grasp the response until much later. Id. at 34 ("I
have the number of the rule I want. Maybe I am not understanding it. But Rule 26, I think,
(e)(2) [sic], says-says, among other things, that the judge can change the number of
depositions you get."); cf id. at 13-14 ("I thought Rule 8 was move for a more definite
statement."). Justice Ginsburg also pointed out to Justice Breyer that a competent trial judge,
backed by the sanctions of Rule 11, should be able to prevent abuse of the discovery system. Id.
at 19-20. Eventually, Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent touting the district court's limiting
of discovery as an alternative means to protect defendants. Iqbal 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). But cf Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 723-24 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment) (expressing doubt in the district court's case-management ability to protect the
defendant).
Unfortunately, such a posture enflamed Justice Scalia, who expressed outrage that
important people's time was at the mercy of a federal district judge. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 78, at 35 ("Well, I mean, that's lovely: That the ability of the Attorney
General and the Director of the FBI to-to do their jobs without having to litigate personal
liability is dependent upon the discretionary decision of a single district judge."). We pass
quietly over the question of whether that is exactly what the rule of law is about: that power
should sometimes have to stand to answer even when inconvenient.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49, 77-87 (trying further to define
"plausibility").
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world of pleading, it was largely new to the world of civil procedure.
Apparently, the Twombly Court settled upon it because the Second Circuit
had mentioned it below as having been used in a handful of prior antitrust
cases, a field of law where substantive precedent already aggressively policed
permissible inferences. 112 Yet the Second Circuit, in upholding Twombly's
complaint, had treated plausibility as a minimal test almost separate from
sufficiency of pleading: "[S]hort of the extremes of 'bare bones' and
'implausibility,' a complaint in an antitrust case need only contain the 'short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief" that Rule 8(a) requires." 13 Without discernible thought, but with
originality, Justice Souter adopted a different use of the word. As a
consequence, he later faced an uphill battle in trying to keep his Twombly
use of "plausible" under control, prompting his Iqbal reminder "that a court
must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may
be." 114
Nevertheless, others could argue that the Court knew what it was doing.
It clearly had concerns about meritless claims flooding the courts and
generating heaps of discovery. Justices on the right and even on the left
might have gotten this sense from conversing with lower-court judges at
conferences, or they might have gleaned a need from the litigation-crisis
propaganda we all ingest.115 The Justices' means of addressing the supposed
problem were limited, however. Adjusting their reading of Rule 8(a)(2)
might have been the only lever they could see to lean on. 116 And so they
leaned on it. They might even have intended their move to be destabilizing,
bringing on a cultural revolution to induce change. If so, they are likely to
get their wish.
IV. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
Regardless of the Court's motivation, Twombly and Iqbal leave the legal
system with the question of how to restabilize. The superiority of the
112. Twombly v. Bell Ad. Corp. (Twombly 1), 425 F.3d 99, 111 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing,
inter alia, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)), vacating 313
F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, 35, 48, Bell At.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 3422211 (showing Justice
Souter latching onto the term "plausible," despite the resistance of counsel).
113. Twombly , 425 F.3d at 111.
114. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter,J., dissenting).
115. See Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court
System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 530-34 (1989) (discussing the impact of vantage point on
perception); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 717, 741 (1998) (discussing the impact of anecdote on perception).
116. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure,
93 JUDICATURE 109, 116-19 (2009) (arguing that a case decision was institutionally the only way
to change the status quo in pursuit of the Court's vision for solving the problems of
contemporary litigation).
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remedial route turns on whether pleading should play a greater gatekeeping
role in modem civil litigation, a question on which we have no well-
developed view. Some thoughtful people have so argued; 117 equally
thoughtful people believe otherwise.
118
To reiterate, our criticism of Twombly and Iqba4 as opposed to their
cure, does not depend on a stance for or against a stronger gatekeeping role
for pleading. As further evidence for that proposition, we briefly sketch two
paths that might be taken toward restabilization: one by those sympathetic to
the new test's aims who nonetheless deplore the instability it has introduced,
and the other by those who wish to undo Twombly-Iqbal Both sketches are
incomplete. We offer them not as fleshed-out proposals, but as indications of
the directions such proposals might take and as contrasts to the path the
majorities took in Twombly and IqbaL
A. RETOUCHING TWOMBLY-IQBAL
Suppose one believed that-either in general or in certain cases-
notice pleading did an inadequate job of screening out factually weak cases,
that is, cases destined to fail but only after expensive discovery. How might
one approach the problem? Again, responsible reformers would first seek to
verify their belief. It would be folly not to seek at least some quick and dirty
data here. Let us, however, leap over this important task and assume that
good studies verified that certain complaints, or civil complaints in general,
suffered from inadequate threshold gatekeeping and that tighter pleading
rules could screen out substantial numbers of false positives at an acceptable
cost in terms of false negatives. We can then offer two possible ways to
implement such a new regime.
117. See, e.g., JOINT PROJECT OF THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAwYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY
& THE INST. FOR THE ADvANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs., FINAL REPORT 5-6 (2009)
(supporting a return to code-style fact pleading); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly:
How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 99
(2007) (approving the result of Twombly by supporting "dismissal at the close of pleadings in
any case where the defendant has negated all inferences of culpability by using the same kinds
of public evidence that the plaintiff has used to establish a factual underpinning to the
underlying complaint"); Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v.
Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 93-98 (2008) (criticizing lenient pleading rules); Douglas G. Smith,
The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal 2, 18-19 (Aug. 28, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1463844 (approving Iqbal as
an evolution in the pleading standard that is likely to increase the efficiency and fairness of civil
practice).
118. This position is probably the majority view among academics. A fine statement of the
position lies in A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 460-89 (2008)
(strongly criticizing the new regime of pleading); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding
Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (2009) (arguing that pleading today centrally
requires a complaint to describe events about which there is a presumption of impropriety).
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The first possibility would be to revise Rule 9 to include more classes of
cases, while abrogating Twombly and Iqbal as a general rule. 119 The present
Rule 9(b) requires complaints "alleging fraud or mistake" to "state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake."1 20 If one
could identify other categories of cases that would profit from such a
provision, one could add these categories to Rule 9(b). 121 One great
advantage of this path flows from the seventy years of interpretation of the
"particularity" requirement: competent litigators have a fairly good idea of
what the phrase requires in terms of factual detail and so do judges. 122 We
119. See, e.g., Posting of Gregory Sisk, gcsisk@stthomas.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (June
6, 2009) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (proposing such a reform); cf Stephen B. Burbank,
Pleading and the Dilemmas off"G eneral Rules," 2009 Wis. L. REv. 535, 537 (arguing that substantive-
specific federal common law could modify the transsubstantive Federal Rules on pleading);
Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST.JOHN'S L.
REv. 877, 879 (2008) (concluding that "certain classes of cases may well warrant particularized
pleading but that the decision should be made by the rulemakers through amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not by judges on an ad hoc basis"); Paul Stancil, Balancing
the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 90, 147 (2009) (calling for a return to fact pleading, but
for only certain "high-risk" classes of cases).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
121. For several decades, there has been a persistent contention that civil-rights claims,
especially where the defendants asserted their immunity, would be good candidates for such
inclusion. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 574-82 (2002)
(criticizing lower-court civil-rights cases that required heightened pleading); Christopher M.
Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 987, 1027-32 (2003) (commenting on the
heavy burden that heightened pleading places on plaintiffs); Marcus, supra note 12, at 1751
(describing cases raising the pleading standard); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444-51 (1986) (discussing the
reaction to liberal notice pleading, resulting in heightened pleading for certain, enumerated
types of cases). The Court has regularly pushed aside such arguments with the point that, if
true, the right path was to propose a change in the Federal Rules. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-15 (2002) (involving a Title VII employment-discrimination claim);
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993) (involving a civil-rights claim against a municipality). We are skeptical that such a Rule
change is a good idea. However, if adopting different pleading rules is a good idea, the earlier
Court was correct in its opinion that a Rule change accomplished through established
rulemaking procedures, not a judicial opinion, is the proper way to go. SeeJones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 224 (2007) ("We once again reiterate ... that adopting different and more onerous
pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be done through established
rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts.").
122. See, e.g., Stradford v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 02 CIV. 3628, 2002 WL 31027517, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2002). The Stradford court stated:
Thus, it is unclear from the face of the [fraud] counterclaims whether defendants
assert that Dr. Stradford's claimed losses are improperly inflated, that Dr.
Stradford's office never even flooded, or that the offices flooded, but not during
the term of the Policy. In essence, defendants claim that Dr. Stradford lied, but fail
to identify the lie.
Id. at *3; see also CLARK, supra note 11, at 225-40 (treating heightened pleading under the code
regimes); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9, §§ 1296-1301.1 (treating heightened pleading
under the federal regime).
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would be spared the years of wandering in the "nonconclusory plausibility"
wilderness to which we now seem doomed. An even greater advantage is that
courts can sensibly demand factual detail, whereas testing for factual
convincingness without an evidential basis is inherently destabilizing.
123
A second, more elaborate way to preserve the new gatekeeping function
in a fair fashion would involve facing the real concern of discovery124 and
then borrowing a page from criminal procedure. 2 5 A criminal equivalent of
civil discovery is search and seizure: both procedures put in parties' hands
the power to compel an adversary to disclose information. The criminal law,
however, features a much more regulated procedure. In general, to justify a
criminal search, the police need either a warrant, which certifies that a
magistrate believes there is probable cause to justify the intrusion on
privacy, 126 or exigent circumstances, such as an arrest combined with
probable cause, which make a warrantless search constitutional. 127 Were one
convinced that U.S. civil litigants enjoyed excessive powers of discovery,
128
one might try to create a noncriminal version of a search warrant.
Accordingly, to preserve the new gatekeeping function in a fair fashion,
civil rulemakers might require as the price of admission to discovery-
123. See supra text accompanying note 49 (discussing the lack of precedent for testing
convincingness on bare pleadings).
124. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1255-70 (2008)
(criticizing Twombly from a broad perspective, but ultimately approving a limited screening of
conclusory pleadings unless the pleader can show a special need for discovery); Randal C.
Picker, Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 176-77
(suggesting that the Supreme Court should have proceeded instead by limiting discovery);
Posting of Eric Freedman, Professor, Hofstra Law School, lawemf@hofstra.edu, to civ-
pro@listserv.nd.edu (Sept. 4, 2009) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (suggesting disallowance
of dismissals on the ground that a pleading is conclusory or implausible, "unless the court also
determines that it is clear to a legal certainty that the factual contentions could not have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery"). For a
very sensible warning against trying to cure pleading without also considering discovery and
case management, see generally Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss,
LITIGATION, Spring 2009, at 1, available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/journal/opening.
statements/O9spring.pdf.
125. See, e.g., Posting of Bryan Camp, Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law,
bryan.camp@ttu.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (July 7, 2009) (on file with the Iowa Law
Review) (suggesting a criminal-law analogy). For an article treating civil-criminal comparisons
more generally, see generally David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683
(2006).
126. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE 5-7 (2004) (discussing search warrants).
127. See id. at 446-51 (discussing warrantless searches); see also 3 id. chs. 5-7 (discussing
warrantless searches in greater depth).
128. Indeed, many foreign observers, accustomed to the Continental system of investigative
processes supervised by judges, find distressing the power put into the hands of U.S. civil
litigants. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL
L. REV. 299 (2002) (comparing discovery practices).
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imposed if the opposing party has successfully met the standard for dismissal
under Twombly-Iqba--that the claimant demonstrate something like
probable cause to believe that allowing discovery before dismissal would
yield significant pertinent evidence.12 9 The judge would apply either the
criminal probable-cause standard or some other standard, likely less
demanding. 130 The judge could, as always, appropriately limit any allowed
discovery.
In creating any such procedure, the drafters of the amended Rules
would have to provide the necessary guidance to litigants and courts on what
factors to consider. The procedure need not apply invariantly to all
complaints. For example, the procedure might take into account any
resource inequality or information asymmetry between the parties, or any
especially heavy burdens or benefits of the particular litigation. 13 1 Twombly
and Iqbal, of course, provide no such guidance.
B. UNDOING TWOMBLY-IQBAL
Alternatively, one might well believe that notice pleading did a
reasonably good job and that, especially in a relatively lightly regulated
society, easy access to civil justice served important goals. By now, this side
also has some obligation to seek data. If this side were to obtain some
empirical support, then the appropriate question would become how to
undo the harm caused by Twombly and IqbaL A brace of relatively simple
alternatives-simple conceptually, though perhaps not politically-lie open.
129. Alternatively, one could build the procedure onto the existing framework for
discovery, so that FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) would require each party to disclose all evidence
supporting its claim or defense early in the case.
One could come at this solution from the opposite direction, that is, one could
abrogate Twombly-Iqbal as a pleading test but give the defendant a means to cut out discovery in
weak cases. For example, one could allow the defendant to make an early summary-judgment
motion that would require the plaintiff either to show reasonable possibility, or plausibility, of
the claim or to show under FED. R. CWv. P. 56(f) a reasonable possibility that discovery would
yield significant pertinent evidence. Indeed, this route does not require much change in
existing procedural law.
130. Denial of the discovery warrant would completely block the plaintiff who does not yet
have the necessary information that discovery could deliver, while denying a search warrant is
just one closed door along the corridor of criminal procedure. Arguably, then, a better
standard would be the "reasonable suspicion" from stop-and-frisk law, rather than the
"substantial possibility" (or perhaps more) associated with criminal law's probable cause. See
Clermont, supra note 47, at 1124 (specifying criminal standards of decision). Alternatively, one
could more vaguely require a showing of "good cause," a term that at least sounds more civil
than criminal. The discovery Rules have made liberal use of that term from the beginning, as in
FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
131. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 39, 42-54 (2008) (using economic analysis
to conclude that pleading standards should vary with the case's evidentiary demands and the
social costs of litigation).
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First, the obvious route to reform is through amendment of the Federal
Rules. On the thought that the Court is ready neither to overrule these
recent cases nor to welcome a direct amendment to Rule 8, however, some
have suggested the tactic of encouraging the rulemakers to draft additional
pleading samples for the Appendix of Forms of the Federal Rules.132 One
such form would be a sample antitrust complaint in which the plaintiff made
a conclusory allegation of agreement. A second such form would be a Bivens
allegation of intentionally unlawful behavior by high public officials, again
cast in the conclusory form the Court found objectionable. But these forms,
imposing somewhat awkward interpretive tasks even if expressing certain
desired results nicely, could appear to be even more of a public repudiation
of the Court's work in Twombly and Iqbal than an amendment to Rule 8.
Because no such changes would reach the Court without the approval of the
members of the several rulemaking bodies through which such proposals
pass--dominated by judges but also containing respected litigators and
academics--one can imagine that the Justices would think several times
before rejecting the proposed changes. Nonetheless, one can picture the
Court refusing to promulgate the added forms.
Second, given this fear that the Court would impede any repudiation of
its work, another route would detour through Congress. 133 Congress has the
132. See, e.g., Posting of Jonathan Siegel, Professor, George Washington University Law
School, jsiegel@law.gwu.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (May 19, 2009) (on file with the Iowa
Law Review) (proposing such a reform); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 84 (providing that "forms in the
Appendix suffice under these rules"); 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD
L. MARcus, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3162 (2d ed. 1997) ("Thus, it is clear that a
pleading, motion, or other paper that follows one of the Official Forms cannot be successfully
attacked."). The Civil Rules Advisory Committee has the monitoring of Twombly and Iqbal on its
current agenda. See Mauro, supra note 28, at 32 (describing the current posture of the Advisory
Committee); see also Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes 31-35 (Nov. 8-9, 2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV11-2007-min.pdf (expressing cautious interest);
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes 35 (Apr. 7-8, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/CV04-2008-min.pdf (postponing the discussion); Civil Rules Advisory Comm.,
Minutes 17 (Nov. 17-18, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CVll-
2008-min.pdf (same).
133. See, e.g., Posting of David Shapiro, Professor, Harvard Law School,
dshapiro@law.harvard.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (July 7, 2009) (on file with the Iowa Law
Review) (offering an amendment that Congress could make to FED. R. CIv. P. 8). Professor
Shapiro proposed:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute or in these rules, an allegation of
fact, or of the application of law to fact, shall [must?] not be held insufficient on
the grounds that it is conclusory and/or implausible, unless the rules governing
judicial notice require a determination that the allegation is not credible.
Id. In fact, on July 22, 2009, Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill to restore the status quo
ante, pending further study. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). It could, of course, undergo revision
after committee hearings, but it currently provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of
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undoubted power to alter the Federal Rules.' 34 Concededly, frustrated
reformers should hesitate before running to Congress to turn a judicial
matter into a legislative one. But the basic design choice here at stake may
be at least as legislative as it is judicial in nature. In any event, we note that a
enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule
12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Id. In a congressional hearing on December 2, 2009, Professor Stephen Burbank suggested
redrafting the bill so that federal pleading would simply revert to the "interpretations ... that
existed on May 20, 2007," which was the day before the Twombly decision. Whether the Supreme
Court Has Limited Americans' Access to Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. app. A, at 22 (2009) (prepared statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of
Pennsylvania Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%
20Testimony.pdf. However, Michael C. Dorf, Should Congress Change the Standard for Dismissing a
Federal Lawsuit, FINDLAW, July 29, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090729.html,
sharply criticized the bill's approach. He proposed this version instead:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of
enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not deem a pleading inadequate under
rule 8(a)(2) or rule 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the
ground that such pleading is conclusory or implausible, unless the court may take
judicial notice of the implausibility of a factual allegation. So long as the pleaded
claim or defense provides fair notice of the nature of the claim or defense, and the
allegations, if taken to be true, would support a legally sufficient claim or defense,
a pleading satisfies the requirements of rule 8.
Dorf on Law, An Alternative to Senator Specter's Notice Pleading Bill, http://www.dorfonlaw.
org/2009/07/alternative-to-senator-specters-notice_28.html (July 29, 2009, 3:13 EDT); see also
Posting of Arthur Wolf, awolf@law.wnec.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Oct. 20, 2009) (on file
with the Iowa Law Review) (proposing an amendment of Rule 8(a) (2) to read either "a short
and plain statement giving [sufficient] notice of the claim upon which relief can be granted" or
"a short and plain statement of the claim upon which relief can be granted so that a party can
[may] reasonably prepare a response"). On November 19, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler
introduced another bill to similar effect. H.R. 4115, lllth Cong. (2009). It would add a new 28
U.S.C. § 2078 providing:
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b) (6), (c) or (e) of Rule
12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the
plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those
subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents
of the complaint do not show the plaintiffs claim to be plausible or are insufficient
to warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.
H.R 4115.
134. The most recent-though unfortunate-example is the congressional addition to FED.
R. CIv. P. 35. At one point, the Rule provided that only a physician could conduct a mental
examination, thus excluding clinical psychologists. See Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and
Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judgment and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEP. L. REv.
455, 481 (1997) (describing the sequence of events by which Congress amended the Federal
Rules without any public notice). A senator, whose daughter happened to be a licensed clinical
psychologist, successfully sponsored legislation amending the Rule to include her specialty. Id.
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statutory amendment to Rule 8-stating the "short and plain statement"
need not be "nonconclusory" or "plausible," although as always it could still
fail for being legally insufficient or factually frivolous-would serve as a
quick and effective repudiation of Twombly and Iqbal.135 With the status quo
ante so restored, the ordinary rulemaking machinery could take over.
C. RESTORING STABILITY
However the dust settles, the ball would then be bouncing back into the
court of the ordinary rulemaking machinery. The rulemakers should soon
commence a study of exactly where, in the middle between the two camps,
the optimal pleading standard lies. The resolution of the pleading problem
probably should have started with the rulemakers, but it surely should finish
there.
Our point is simple: Twombly and Iqbal have introduced a wild card, a
factor of substantial instability, at the threshold stage of civil process through
which all litigation must pass. We think the Court meant well in both of
those decisions. Thrusting good intentions into a complex system, however,
can have some very bad consequences. Here, the results are not likely to be
pretty. The good news is that the states, including those that have adopted
some version of the Federal Rules, are not bound by Twombly or Iqbal, and
therefore can choose to proceed unaffected by those viral decisions. The
bad news is that within the federal system, the Twombly-Iqbal virus is likely to
infect civil proceedings unless someone in a position to act does something
soon.
135. The thus-amended Rule 8(a) (2) could require "a short and plain statement of the
claim-regardless of its nonconclusory plausibility-showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." A longer version might simply append a sentence to Rule 8(e): "The pleading, if
otherwise sufficient, need not satisfy a requirement of nonconclusory plausibility." A still longer
version would spell out the meaning of the clumsy phrase "nonconclusory plausibility,"
although we think that such detail is unnecessary to dispose of an identifiable judge-made test.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT







Civil Action No. 1:09-cv-2192-CEC
Order Granting
Motion to Dismiss
In his complaint, after alleging jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of
citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy, plaintiffs statement of
his claim (which is followed by a brief paragraph alleging the injuries for
which compensation is sought) reads, in full, as follows:
On January 5, 2009, at the corner of Boylston and Tremont Streets in
Boston, Massachusetts, defendant willfully or recklessly or negligently drove
a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.
Defendant has moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for failure
to state a claim. With respect to the former, defendant points to the
inadequacy of the allegation that "Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of
Massachusetts and defendant is a citizen of the state of Wyoming." She notes
that even if the court accepts the allegation of plaintiff's citizenship for
purposes of the motion, it should not accept as plausible the conclusory
allegation of defendant's legal status as a citizen of Wyoming. She notes that
of the approximately six billion people in the world, only about one-half a
million have even a plausible legal claim to be citizens of Wyoming, and that
the odds that she is a citizen of that state are therefore approximately only 1
in 12,000. Thus, she contends, the bare allegation of this legal conclusion of
state citizenship does not begin to "plausibly suggest" the existence of
federal jurisdiction (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009)).
Though we note the force of defendant's argument, we need not decide
whether the Iqbal test applies to allegations of jurisdiction because it is
evident that plaintiff has failed to set forth anything more than a
"[t]hreadbare recital[] of the elements of a cause of action," Iqbal, at 1949,
and thus the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be granted.
The allegation of willfulness, recklessness, or negligence is but an
unsupported assertion of a legal conclusion (actually a series of mutually
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exclusive legal conclusions) dependent on facts that are nowhere set forth.
The services of this court, which has been established by Congress acting
pursuant to the authority conferred on it by the Constitution itself, may not
be invoked so casually.
Plaintiff argues that his complaint is fully consistent with Form 11, in
the Appendix to the Federal Rules. That argument is not only unavailing but
self-defeating. A complaint, in order to state a claim under the Rules, must
do more than simply fill in the blanks on a boilerplate form. Indeed, a
complaint that does no more than that is especially suspect.
Plaintiff asks that, in any event, he be given leave to amend. But he has
already wasted enough of this court's time in considering a woefully
inadequate complaint. He should not be granted the privilege of refiling.
For these reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b) (6) is granted, and the complaint is dismissed without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: October 8, 2009 Charles E. Clark
United States DistrictJudge
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